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Abstract 
Cybersecurity risks threaten the digital economy, 
including digital trade enabled by digital technologies. 
As parts of cybersecurity capability building, 
governments implement fragmented, in-flux policies to 
manage cybersecurity threats from cross-border digital 
activities. However, the lack of shared understandings 
of cybersecurity within cross-border digital innovations 
raises an increasing debate about how cybersecurity 
capability building policies can impact digital trade 
restrictions. This study develops a National Cyber 
Trade Behavior model to examine the relationship 
between national cybersecurity capability and digital 
trade restrictions. Utilizing the PLS-SEM-based path 
analysis, we draw empirical evidence to verify the 
developed model and reveal that building cybersecurity 
capability can indirectly support an open digital trade 
system, mediated by E-government maturity.  
1. Introduction
Our modern society is moving toward digital
society driven by transformational information 
technology [17], including how trade happens and what 
is being traded. Digital trade, loosely defined as 
transactions of trade in goods and services which are 
digitally ordered, enabled, or delivered [25], has become 
a driving force of global digital economic growth. 
Although digital trade is unlocking more business 
opportunities, weak cybersecurity within digital 
technology is becoming a growing threat [8, 18]. As 
digital trade sits at the intersection of digitization and 
trade, it is affected by governments’ increasing policies 
to manage cybersecurity threats from digital trade. 
Given the lack of standard rules of cybersecurity [22], 
we can observe two different policy implementations 
that can impact the cross-border digitization.  
Some governments seek to implement policies to 
restrict digital innovation to maintain political 
stabilities, trust, personal and national cybersecurity, 
and enforce the cyber-sovereignty. For instance, on May 
15, 2019, the U.S. issued the “executive order on 
securing the information and communications 
technology and services supply chain,” declaring a 
national emergency to deal with the threats from 
information and communication technologies (ICTs). 
The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of 
Industry and Security (BIS) then added Huawei 
Technologies and its affiliates to the “Entity List,” 
which bans U.S. firms doing business with Huawei. 
On the other hand, some nations are also 
implementing cybercrime legislation, national 
cybersecurity strategies (NCS), computer emergency 
response teams (CERTs), etc. to improve their 
capabilities to mitigate potential cyber threats and 
ensure cyberspace resilience. For example, as one of the 
first countries to create a cybersecurity strategy in 2008, 
Estonia has invested significantly in cybersecurity. The 
Estonian Information Security Association (EISA) was 
founded in 2018 to further coordinate cybersecurity 
commitments, including supporting the E.U. contractual 
Public-Private-Partnership model on cybersecurity. 
Though these two types of policy implementations 
are not exclusive, some studies claimed that 
governments implement digital trade restrictions in the 
name of protecting critical infrastructure and national 
security from cyber threats, but have little to do with 
cybersecurity [14]. Others claim that these cybersecurity 
rules can address national security issues, ensure 
consumer privacy, and create a more secure digital 
society [22, 36]. Due to the lack of understanding of 
how cybersecurity and digital trade are connected, these 
debates create significant uncertainty for the global 
digital economy. Hence, this study aims to answer the 
following question: how does the national cybersecurity 
capability building impact digital trade restrictions? 
By contextualizing the studies on security 
behaviors [1] to the digital trade system, we consider 
building cybersecurity capability as a national behavior 
to increase the endogenous ability to mitigate cyber 
threats, and implementing digital trade restrictions as a 
national behavior to control and avoid cyber threats. 
Furthermore, the policy diffusion theory [10] suggests 
that the path dependency, internal actor, and external 
actor can impact public policy adoption and diffusion, 
which can apply to digital trade systems. As the e-
government maturity can increase transparency, public 
access to information, and digital innovation adoption 





[21, 32], it can increase the governmental knowledge 
about digitization and twist the implementation of 
digital trade policies. Based on these propositions from 
information systems, public policy, digital trade, and the 
e-government discipline, this study develops a National
Cyber Trade Behavior model to analyze the impact of
national cybersecurity capability building on digital
trade restrictions.
Based on the empirical evidence from 46 countries 
representing more than 80% of international trade in 
services, this study reveals a significant negative impact 
from national cybersecurity capability to the digital 
trade restrictions, which is indirect and mediated by E-
government maturity. In other words, the cybersecurity 
capability building efforts which can improve the e-
government maturity can eventually reduce digital trade 
restrictions. Otherwise, they may turn out as digital 
trade restrictions. Instead of deterring the adoption of 
digitization, cyber incidents can motivate investment in 
cybersecurity, promote E-government maturity, and 
foster a more open digital trade system.  
These findings provide a tool for business leaders 
and policymakers to manage cybersecurity threats 
within digital trade systems. The developed model 
suggests that a nation with high trade dependency, high 
e-government maturity, and high cybersecurity
capability will have low digital trade restrictions. If the
cybersecurity policy can promote e-government
maturity, it has a high potential to reduce digital trade
restrictions. This mediation effect of e-government
maturity will support international business, especially
multinational enterprises, to evaluate the potential
cybersecurity policy risk in a specific international
market and align their global digital strategy to identify
opportunities and avoid costly surprises. It also suggests
that cybersecurity capability practices from those
nations with high e-government maturity can be more
practical to mitigate cybersecurity threats from digital
trade. Hence the international community should learn
from those practices to build applicable norms to
manage cyber threats within digital trade.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Information Security Behaviors 
Many studies on individuals’ security behaviors [1, 
23]1 have made significant progress in understanding
the processes that motivate individuals to take protective
actions, seek help, or avoid different security threats.
1 A variety of theories, including deterrence theory, control theory, 
institutional theory, protection motivation theory, theory of planned 
behavior, emotional theory etc. have been developed to delve into 
the behavioral aspects of individual security behaviors. Due to space 
Many factors can influence individuals’ cognitive 
reasoning,  such as costs/rewards, facilitating 
conditions, formal/informal punishment, perceived 
behavioral control, response efficacy, severity, shame, 
subjective norms, susceptibility and violation 
motivation, national culture, etc. Such reasoning will 
drive individuals to take a problem-focused coping 
action to protect themselves against cyber threats or 
avoid adopting technologies to forbear the threats. 
At the organizational level [6, 33], organizational 
factors such as the support of top management and the 
available internal resources, etc.; environmental factors 
such as the peer pressure, the availability of the external 
support resources and the national culture, etc.; and 
technical factors including the relative advantage, 
perceived complexity, compatibility, and trainability, 
etc., collectively influence the organizational decision to 
adopt new technologies. Whitman’s framework [34] 
provides a holistic view of the policy development 
lifecycle and has been widely adopted to develop and 
implement organizational information security policies. 
 While these above studies have provided 
revelatory insights about individual security behavior 
and organizational adoption, the interaction between 
different behaviors is somewhat overlooked. When we 
consider security behavior at the national level, the 
mechanism for national-level policies can be somewhat 
different. A study revealing how nations balance the two 
cybersecurity behaviors is needed. Additionally, the 
current findings of the factors that influence behaviors, 
such as the response efficacy, self-efficacy, perceived 
costs, etc. are not always consistent from different 
studies [15]. These inconsistent results warrant more 
empirical studies and testing, especially when 
considering security behaviors within a different 
context: national cybersecurity behaviors for digital 
trade. Furthermore, many existing studies focus on 
compliance and non-compliance with information 
security policy [23, 37]. The understanding of the 
information security policy itself, especially within the 
digital trade system, are limited. 
2.2 Impacts of Digital Trade Restriction 
Due to the increasing importance of digital trade to 
economic growth, digital trade policy, innovation and 
governance are relatively new but critical. Drawing 
from case studies on health services, online advertising, 
and uses of customer data for operational efficiency, 
Goldfarb and Tucker revealed that privacy regulations 
limitations, instead of acknowledging each paper, we refer to two 
recent literature review articles that summarize the state-of-the-art of 
studies on individual security behaviors.
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negatively impact innovative activities [9]. A few 
empirical models are developed to quantify the effect of 
restrictive policies on innovation and productivity. For 
example, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
model is used to estimate the negative economic impact 
of the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), concluding a loss of more than 300,000 jobs 
and 1.3 percent of GDP due to trade reduction [20]. The 
restrictive data policies tend to reduce the company’s 
productivity across different industry sectors, 
particularly those that are more data-intensive [7]. 
These studies mostly focus on the negative impact 
of data restriction policies. However, digital trade is 
much broader than just data flow [25]. Digital trade 
restrictions also include policies like tariffs on digital 
goods, filtering and blocking, Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) infringement, national standards, and 
burdensome conformity assessment and regulations to 
limit disinformation and DDoS attacks [22]. The 
implementation of these digital trade restrictions is also 
unclear, making it difficult for organizations to 
understand the global digitization environment. It is 
critical to study the factors that impact the adoption of 
such digital trade restrictions. 
2.3 Policy Adoption and Diffusion 
Policy diffusion theories have been developed to 
understand how states/nations adopt new public policies 
and the factors that influence policy adoption [10, 29, 
30]. The Walker-Gray-Berry-and-Berry framework has 
served as the cornerstone framework for studies on 
policy diffusion: Walker conceptualized and tested the 
policy diffusion in the U.S. states’ context, Gray 
developed the now-standard S-curve pattern to 
characterize policy adoption. The event history analysis 
(EHA) was introduced by Berry and Berry to study 
internal and regional influences on policy diffusion. 
Recent work builds on these frameworks has continued 
to analyze new features that impact policy diffusion, 
including policy entrepreneurs, actions of the national 
government, amendments to existing policies, the role 
of political institutions and policy success, national 
culture, and path dependence [10, 29].  
Though policy diffusion patterns have been studied 
in many different areas and contexts, most of these 
studies focus on examining components of a single 
policy, while few looks into multiple policies 
simultaneously. The relationships between different 
policies are also overlooked. In this study, we 
distinguish the adoption of two different digital trade 
policies: building cybersecurity capability or 
implementing digital trade restrictions. 
2.4 E-government Maturity Research 
An increasing number of studies [2, 3, 13, 21, 24, 
32] analyzed the e-government maturity model and the
factors that influence e-government adoption, including
technological, leadership, government, human, social-
cultural, national culture, economic development,
political, geographical and demographic factors. For
example, information quality characteristics and
channel characteristics, both mediated and moderated
by transparency and trust, impact the citizens’ intentions
to use e-government services [3]. The public value of e-
government on increasing transparency, digital
innovation adoption, fostering an open, inclusive, and
responsive government, and corruption controlling are
widely discussed [32]. E-government maturity was
considered an important manifestation of anti-
corruption endeavors. The e-government can increase
government transparency, enable citizens’ participation
in public policy adoption, and reduce the costs of
transparency efforts, moderated by the national culture
and the economic development [24]. However, the e-
government’s impact on the digital trade policy
implementation is unclear, and more in-depth empirical
evidence is valuable.
Additionally, increasing digital connectivity is 
creating cyber-attack vectors for attackers. Cyber 
incidents targeting governments are making headlines 
globally, including Bulgaria, India, Singapore, and the 
United States, to name just a few. It is necessary to 
understand whether these increasing cyber threats will 
deter E-government adoption and turn the government 
to develop more restrictive digital trade policies. 
3 Conceptual Model 
As shown in Figure 1, in our conceptualization of 
the national cyber trade behavior model, we distinguish 
two main behaviors to handle cybersecurity issues 
within digital trade: building national cybersecurity 
capability to cope with cyber threats, named building 
cybersecurity capability, and implementing digital trade 
restrictions to avoid cyber threats through digital trade, 
named implementing digital restriction. 
Figure 1. National cyber trade behavior model* 
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*We number the hypotheses from right bottom to left top to make it easier to digest the 
model. 
From a resource-based view, available resources 
and knowledge about potential threats shape the 
decision making and the performance of the outcome 
[24]. Within the digital trade context, the government’s 
digitization knowledge and capability can impact their 
behaviors in the digital trade policies implementation. 
More specifically, governments with better digitization 
capabilities will better understand digital trading, 
including cyber threats through digital trade. As the 
digital products and services to promote E-government 
maturity, including both software and hardware, rely 
heavily on global supply chains [4]. In contrast, 
restrictive digital trade policies will limit the capability 
to access necessary international resources and increase 
e-government development costs. Nations with higher
E-government maturity intend to avoid restrictive
digital trade policies. On the other hand, e-government
development can increase government transparency and
openness [2], driving a more open digital trade system.
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relation between E-
government maturity and digital trade restriction.  
Path dependency [26] has been widely studied in 
public policy diffusion studies to explain the impact of 
institutional history on policy change, as the preceding 
situations will shape the meaning, purpose, and 
direction of future actions. In the context of digital trade, 
though there exist differences between digital trade and 
traditional trade in services, the way a nation manages 
the general trade in services can shape the 
implementation of digital trade policies. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between 
general service trade restriction and digital trade 
restriction.  
As discussed above, the restrictions on international 
trade, especially the trade in services, can limit the 
government’s capability to utilize global digital 
innovations and resources, consequently impacting its 
e-government development. International trade in
services [35] includes business and professional
services like computer and related services,
communication services like audiovisual services and
telecommunications, educational services, health, and
social services, all of which are essential components for
e-government development. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relation between the 
general service trade restriction and E-government 
maturity.  
Many debates exist regarding trade protectionism 
and liberalism, as protectionism and free trade both have 
benefits and costs for economic growth [5, 31]. For a 
nation that highly depends on international trade, 
building restrictions on trade will reduce its 
international trade and consequently harm its economic 
growth, at least in the short term. Hence, restrictive trade 
policies can be costlier for a nation whose economy is 
built on international trade. The increased cost of trade 
restrictions will prevent the adoption of restrictive 
policies [1]. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relation between 
national trade dependence and digital trade restriction.  
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relation between 
national trade dependence and general service trade 
restriction.  
The perceived threat is a critical component in 
motivating the coping behaviors that avert potential 
harm [1]. It represents the extent to which a particular 
event is perceived as dangerous or harmful, reflecting 
the objective’s assessment of their susceptibility to the 
threat and of perceived severity of the danger. Recently 
we have observed increasing cyberattacks targeting 
government information systems, such as the 
ransomware attack on the U.S. government in Baltimore 
City, the Wannacry cyber attack on the U.K.’s National 
Health Service (NHS). Such attacks may increase 
concerns about the potential threat and immature E-
government, deterring governments from adopting such 
digital technology. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6: There is a negative relation between 
experienced cyber incidents and E-government 
maturity. 
The coping capability, defined as the capability to 
mitigate the perceived threat, is another primary 
cognitive process used in various security behavior 
theories like protection motivation theory (PMT) and 
technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) [23]. 
Previous studies demonstrate that the perceived coping 
abilities, including the response efficacy and self-
efficacy, can motivate individuals to take protective 
actions and reduce the intention to avoid using digital 
technologies. Hence, if the government can manage 
potential cyber threats, they will have a positive attitude 
towards adopting, instead of avoiding, e-government. 
Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relation between 
national cybersecurity capability and E-government 
maturity.  
Cyber-attacking is considered as a tactical tool 
within a state’s arsenal of power, popular for politicians, 
policymakers, and defense contractors. States and non-
state actors can use cyber-attacking as a foreign policy 
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tool, as a means to “impact, change, or modify 
diplomatic and military interactions between entities” 
[19]. However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence 
to demonstrate that cyber operations can shift the 
targeted states’ foreign policy. The impact of the cyber 
attacks can be limited [16]. Instead, the targeted 
governments will improve their cyber capabilities to 
manage potential further cyber threats. For example, 
after Russia infiltrated Estonia in 2007, Estonia began 
to develop its national cyber strategy in 2008. Thus: 
Hypothesis 8: There is a positive relation between 
experienced cyber incidents and national cybersecurity 
capability.  
The economic development has also been viewed 
as an essential factor for e-government adoption [24]. 
Countries with greater economic capacity are better 
poised to accomplish e-government actions and invest 
in cybersecurity capability building. Thus, we 
hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relation between 
economic development level and national cybersecurity 
capability. 
Hypothesis 10: There is a positive relation between 
economic development level and E-government 
maturity.  
Empirical studies confirm that comparative 
advantages across countries can partially explain 
international trade, and economic development will 
impact a country’s comparative advantages in 
international trade [12]. Therefore, we can expect that a 
nation with a higher economic development level will 
have a higher dependency on international trade.  
Hypothesis 11: There is a positive relation between 
economic development level and trade dependency.  
4. Data and Research Methodology
4.1 Data 
To verify the developed conceptual national cyber 
trade behavior model, we create a dataset of indicators 
from different sources. 
The general trade restriction on services, and the 
digital trade restriction, are derived from the OECD 
trade restrictiveness index database. OECD launched a 
project in 2014 aimed at providing an objective 
overview of service trade restrictions. Based on the 
investigation of more than 16,000 laws and regulations 
from 22 sectors in 46 countries, the OECD Service 
Trade Restrictiveness Index database (STRI) offers an 
unprecedented depth of information, covering nearly 
400 different policy measures. The OECD Digital 
Service Trade Restrictiveness Index (D-STRI) is further 
developed to capture the impediments that specifically 
affect digital trade, including the infrastructure and 
connectivity, electronic transactions, payment systems, 
intellectual property rights, and other barriers affecting 
trade in digitally-enabled services such as online 
advertising, encryption and technology transfers.  
The national trade dependency is from the World 
Bank Trade index. This study uses Trade (% of GDP), 
the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), 
to quantify the importance of international trade for a 
given nation. The World Bank’s PPP GNI per capita, 
which refers to the gross national income (GNI) 
converted to international dollars using purchasing 
power parity rates, has been widely used to evaluate 
each nation’s economic development level. In this 
study, we use the log values of PPP GNI per capita to 
represent economic capacity.  
E-government maturity captures each nation’s
maturity of e-government services and digitization 
capability. Since 2003, the United Nations Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs has conducted surveys 
every two years on its member states' e-government 
development. The e-government development index, 
EGDI, is considered as the widely adopted indicator for 
e-government maturity.
We use the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 
published by the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) for the national cybersecurity capability. 
The GCI reference assesses cybersecurity commitments 
across five pillars (legal, technical, organizational, 
capacity building, and cooperation) based on 25 sub-
indicators. An overall GCI score is generated to evaluate 
each government’s cybersecurity capability. 
To quantify the cyber threats for each nation, we 
use events from the Council on Foreign Relations’ 
Cyber Operations Tracker (https://www.cfr.org/ 
interactive/cyber-operations), which lists all publicly 
known instances of significant and state-sponsored 
cyberattacks since 2005. This study then calculates the 
experienced cyber incidents index as the aggregate 
number of incidents that had occurred for each country 
up through the specified year. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for each 
variable within our dataset. In this study, we use the 
2017 data for analysis. We make this decision because 
GCI data in 2016 is not available, and trade dependency 
data for JPN, USA, ISR, and NZL, and GNI data for 
ISL, LVA, and LTU in 2018 is not available when we 
conducted this study. The Shapiro-Wilk test shows a 
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significant w-score for all variables expect GCI, which 
indicates that the datasets we are handling are 
significant, non-normal. Thus PLS-SEM analysis 
technology is a suitable method for this study.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 































46 10.429 1.000 88.000 14.691 0.592*** 
#: EGDI is available bi-yearly. We use the average between EDGI_2016 and EDGI_2018 to 
calculate the EGDI_2017. 
##: The STRI data for ARG is not available to include ARG in this study, resulting in 45 
nations in this study. We will use the Pairwise Deletion strategy, which only deletes those 
cases that exhibit missing values in each pair of variables. 
*** p<0.001  ** p<0.01  * p<0.05  ‡ p<0.1
4.3 Research Method 
Partial least squares structural equation modeling 
(PLS-SEM) is considered as a powerful method for path 
analysis in many disciplines, including strategic 
management, marketing, accounting, operations 
management, and human resource management, etc. 
[11, 27, 28]. Specifically, PLS-SEM is more suitable 
when the study (1) focuses on understanding the nature 
of relationships as opposed to the magnitude of those 
relationships, (2) uses single-item constructs as PLS 
allows for “unrestricted use of single-item constructs” 
and (3) involves non-normal data. As we are developing 
a new national cyber trade behavior model to investigate 
relationships among digital trading, E-government 
maturity, and cybersecurity capability, PLS-SEM is the 
most suitable analysis approach. This study used 
SmartPLS 3.0 to implement the PLS-SEM method and 
analyze the dataset.  
5. Result
5.1 Assessment of the Structural Model 
To evaluate the construct measures' reliability and 
validity in the developed model, we investigate the 
composite reliability indicators, including Cronbach’s 
Alpha, rbo_A, and average variance extracted (AVE), 
which are all 1.000. The Discriminant Validity based on 
the Fornell-Larcker test shows that the AVE's square 
root exceeds all correlations between each factor and 
every other construct. Hence, the developed model 
contains strong psychometric properties. 
To enhance confidence in the PLS-SEM results, we 
apply bootstrapping to determine the level of 
significance. We also conduct the Stone-Geisser test 
using blindfolding to evaluate the developed path 
model's cross-validated predictive relevance. Finally, 
we use the PLSpredict procedure to assess the model’s 
out-of-sample predictive power. 












































0 64.943 46.453 483.760 470.934 
##: The standard deviation is reported in parentheses; *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
As reported in Table 2, the VIF values are all lower 
than 3, eliminating collinearity as an issue for this study. 
The 𝑅𝑅2  values for the key variables: cybersecurity 
capability, E-government maturity, and digital trade 
restriction are all significant, indicating a sufficient 
explanatory power of the developed model. The 𝑄𝑄2 
values are all larger than zero, indicating good 
predictive accuracy. Using the 10-fold cross-validation 
setting in PLSpredict, the results show that comparing 
with the naïve LM (linear regression model) benchmark, 
and the RMSE (root mean squared error) and MAE 
(mean absolute error) in the PLS-SEM analysis are both 
significantly lower. Therefore, the developed structural 
model has high predictive power and is satisfactory. 
5.2 Hypothesis Assessment 
Figure 2 reports the path analysis result. We can see 
that the developed hypotheses, except the impact of the 
general restriction on digital restriction (H2), and the 
impact of cyber threats on governmental digitization 
(H6), are significantly supported. It is worth noting that 
the general service trade restriction does have a positive, 
though not significant, direct impact on the digital trade 
restriction adoption (H2). The experienced cyber 
incidents have a positive, though not significant, direct 
effect on E-government maturity (H6). Hence, the 
previous cyber incidents do not deter nations from e-
government adoption.  
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Figure 2. Path Coefficients Result 
Table 3 summarizes the direct, indirect, and total 
effect for the predictors on the key outcome variables: 
digital trade restriction, E-government maturity, and 
cybersecurity capability. E-government maturity, trade 
dependency, economic development, and cybersecurity 
capability all significantly impact digital trade 
restriction. Though the direct impact of general service 
trade restriction on digital trade restriction is not 
significant, we observe a significant indirect effect, 
resulting in a significant, overall positive impact. The 
path dependence effect from general trade in service to 
digital trade does exist.  
The trade dependency, economic development, and 
cybersecurity capability all have significant positive 
impacts on E-government maturity. The general service 
trade restriction has a significant negative effect on E-
government maturity, indicating that trade restrictions 
limit a government’s capability to promote its e-
government maturity. 
The economic capability significantly supports the 
cybersecurity capability building, and the experienced 
cyber incidents do push governments to invest in 
cybersecurity. Interestingly, the cyber incidents 
themselves do not significantly impact either the e-
government maturity or the digital trade restriction. 
5.3 Mediation Effect 
To evaluate the mediation effect from E-
government maturity and cybersecurity capability, we 
further report the specific indirect effects in Table 4. It 
shows that the E-government maturity has a significant 
indirect-only mediation impact on the effect from 
cybersecurity capability, economic development, and 
general trade service restriction to digital trade 
restriction. This confirms the critical role of E-
government maturity for the digital trade system.  
For effect of experienced cyber incidents on E-
government maturity, the cybersecurity capability 
shows a significant, positive, indirect-only mediation 
impact. Cyber capability also has a significant, partial 
mediation effect on the impact of economic 
development on E-government maturity. This indicates 
that cybersecurity capability can turn the economic 
ability and experienced cyber incidents into motivations 
to promote E-government maturity.  
Cybersecurity capability and E-government 
maturity together show a negative mediation effect for 
the impact of cyber incidents on digital trade restriction. 
Hence, rather than deterring a society from digitization, 
previous cyber incidents can push cybersecurity 
capability building, increase E-government maturity, 
and finally motivate less digital trade restrictions.  
Table 3 Results of PLS-SEM path analysis 




E-government maturity -0.440** (0.147) -0.440** (0.147)
Trade Dependency -0.263**(0.083) -0.117*(0.054) -0.380***(0.071)
Economic Development -0.454***(0.110) -0.454***(0.110)
Cybersecurity Capability -0.129*(0.060) -0.129*(0.060)
General Service Trade Restriction 0.247(0.158) 0.115‡(0.066) 0.361**(0.131) 
Experienced Cyber Incidents -0.054(0.046) -0.054(0.046)
E-government 
Maturity (EGDI) 
Trade Dependency 0.084‡(0.044) 0.084‡(0.044) 
Economic Development 0.573***(0.101) 0.145*(0.057) 0.718***(0.063) 
Cybersecurity Capability 0.293**(0.093) 0.293**(0.093) 
General Service Trade Restriction -0.260*(0.110) -0.260*(0.110)
Experienced Cyber Incidents 0.017(0.098) 0.107**(0.041) 0.124(0.088) 
Cybersecurity 
Capability (GCI) 
Economic Development 0.379***(0.106) 0.379***(0.106) 
Experienced Cyber Incidents 0.363***(0.088) 0.363***(0.088) 
The standard deviation is reported in parentheses; *** p<0.001  ** p<0.01  * p<0.05  ‡ p<0.1  
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Table 4 The Mediation Effect of Cybersecurity Capability and Governmental Digitization 




Percentile BC 95% CI Bca 95% CI 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Mediation Effect from E-government maturity 
Cybersecurity Capability -> E-government maturity -> 




(0.060) -0.256 -0.040 -0.253 -0.050
Experienced Cyber Incidents -> E-government maturity 
-> Digital Restriction NO 
-0.008
(0.047) -0.099 0.046 -0.102 0.047 
Economic Development -> E-government maturity -> 




(0.095) -0.406 -0.104 -0.407 -0.098





(0.066) 0.030 0.243 0.029 0.243 
Mediation Effect from Cybersecurity Capability 
Experienced Cyber Incidents -> Cybersecurity Capability 




(0.041) 0.053 0.189 0.052 0.186 
Economic Development -> Cybersecurity Capability -> E-
government maturity Partial  
0.111* 
(0.052) 0.044 0.210 0.047 0.215 
Mediation Effect from Cybersecurity Capability and E-government maturity 
Experienced Cyber Incidents -> Cybersecurity Capability 




(0.025) -0.104 -0.017 -0.101 -0.016
Economic Development -> Cybersecurity Capability -> E-




(0.029) -0.117 -0.015 -0.114 -0.015
The standard deviation is reported in parentheses; *** p<0.001  ** p<0.01  * p<0.05  ‡ p<0.1  
6 Conclusion and Discussion 
6.1 Theoretical implications 
This study sought to investigate the relationships 
between cybersecurity commitment and digital trade 
restrictions. The evidence from 46 countries show that 
there exists no significant direct impact from 
cybersecurity capability building to digital trade 
restriction, but indirect impact mediated by E-
government maturity. If the policy for cybersecurity 
capability building can promote e-government 
maturity, it can eventually motivate a less restrictive 
digital trade system. However, the cybersecurity 
capability building practices that counteract the e-
government adoption may result in a more stringent 
digital trade system. This elaborates on the debates 
about the impact of cybersecurity on digital trade 
restriction, satisfying our original objective. 
Secondly, our work contextualizes information 
security behavior theories into the national policy 
adoption context by considering building 
cybersecurity capability as taking a protective action, 
and implementing digital restriction as an avoidance 
action. This study empirically shows that the 
perceived cyber threat can motivate the protective 
action by building cybersecurity capability within the 
context of digital trade policy. This observation is 
consistent with many studies on individual and 
organizational behaviors [1, 23]. However, there is no 
significant direct relationship between the experienced 
cyber incidents and the e-government maturity or 
digital trade restriction. Hence, unlike individual 
security behavior, the perceived cyber threat will not 
trigger avoidance behavior for nations. Conversely, 
mediated by the cybersecurity capability building, 
cyber incidents can motivate governments to invest in 
cybersecurity, improve e-government maturity, and 
eventually foster a more open digital trade system. 
This study confirms the value of extending the 
behavioral and organizational studies of cybersecurity 
to the public policy and highlighting the differences 
within the national level policies context. 
This study's third contribution is to extend the 
previous research scope for e-government studies [32]. 
Our study reveals the critical role of e-government 
maturity for a more secure, open digital trade system. 
A mature E-government system can encourage less 
restrictive digital trade policies and mediate the impact 
from cybersecurity capability building, economic 
development, and general service trade restrictions to 
digital trade restrictions. Additionally, a growing body 
of literature has discussed the driving factors for e-
government adoption, including national culture, 
economic development, political, information quality, 
trust and transparency, geographical and demographic 
factors [3]. Beyond these factors, this study further 
confirms that access to global resources through 
international trade and the capability to handle cyber 
threats by cybersecurity capability building can 
significantly impact the E-government maturity.  
6.2 Practical implications 
While digital trade is unlocking more global 
business opportunities, governments' in-flux digital 
trade policies to manage cyber threats are creating 
Page 4359
significant political risks for business.  Organizations 
need to understand these policies to align their global 
digital strategy. This study suggests that a nation with 
high trade dependency, high cybersecurity 
commitment, advantaged e-government maturity, and 
low general trade restrictions would have low digital 
trade restrictions. More specifically, if the 
implementation of a cybersecurity capability building 
policy cannot promote e-government maturity, such a 
policy may turn out as a digital trade barrier. For 
example, our data shows that Indonesia has the lowest 
e-government maturity, low trade dependency, low
cybersecurity capability, and a restrictive trade
environment. Business leaders should prepare for a
restrictive digital trade environment when entering
Indonesia’s digital market. However, given the
significant increase in cybersecurity capability and e-
government maturity, we can expect that Indonesia's
digital trade environment will become less restrictive,
which opens new business opportunities. Hence, the
developed framework can serve as a baseline for
business leaders to evaluate the consequences of
increasing cybersecurity policies and understand the
trend of digital trade environments, which can help
them effectively design their global digital strategy.
On the other hand, the international community 
needs to develop a cyber-secure digital trade system 
that can simultaneously defend against growing cyber 
threats through digital trade and support the global 
digital innovations. This study reveals the mediation 
effect of E-government maturity on the impact from 
cybersecurity capability building to digital trade 
restrictions. Hence, when implementing the 
cybersecurity capability building policy, governments 
should avoid those practices that can hinder the 
promotion of E-government maturity. Additionally, 
the practices from those nations with high 
cybersecurity capability building, high e-government 
maturity, and low digital trade restrictions can provide 
useful insights to develop practical guidance to 
manage cybersecurity issues within the digital trade 
system effectively. Hence, given the significant 
commitment to cybersecurity, the best digital 
governmental capabilities, and the national strategy to 
build the global digital supply chain hub, Singapore is 
best positioned to coordinate the cybersecurity 
governance framework for the digital trade system.  
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Like all studies, this empirical analysis has its 
limitations, and some of them open up opportunities 
for future work. First, only 46 countries from the 
OECD Digital Service Trade Restrictiveness Index 
have the required data for this study. However, these 
46 countries represent over 80% of international trade 
in services. Hence, this study's conclusion is 
representative enough to describe the relationships 
between cybersecurity commitment, e-government 
maturity, and digital trade restriction. Additionally, 
this study employs the PLS-SEM based path analysis 
method, which can handle small sample sizes.  
We acknowledge that the unobserved countries 
have significantly different economic development 
levels, e-government maturities, trade dependencies, 
and cybersecurity commitments. Once their digital 
trade restriction data is available, further studies to 
generalize the developed theory will be valuable. 
The study does not consider other possible 
factors, such as political capacity and national culture. 
Including more diverse interactions could help in 
investigating the cross-country effects. Future studies 
should explore additional variables, especially those 
related to cross-country effects, to construct a more 
refined picture of national cyber trade behaviors. 
In this study, all factors are measured through 
single items, which could be viewed as a limitation. 
However, many previous researchers have argued that 
“the single-item measures can provide an acceptable 
balance between practical needs and psychometric 
concerns” [28] and that these single-item measures can 
be high in validity. PLS-SEM is a suitable method 
when a study uses single-item constructs, as PLS-SEM 
allows for the unrestricted use of single-item 
constructs [11]. However, further studies that include 
more than one item for each factor are valuable to 
increase the results' validity. 
Given the data availability, this study does not 
consider the developed theory's evolution. Future 
research should look into this model's dynamic, such 
as further analysis when data from subsequent years is 
released. More empirical studies to reveal trigger 
factors for such evolution will be precious. 
Finally, this study provides the first step towards 
a governance framework to manage the increasing 
cybersecurity concerns within the digital trade system. 
Further studies to identify the norms from practices to 
guide business leaders and policymakers' decision-
making are also critical. 
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